Tribal gatherings : colonial spectacle, native administration and local government in Condominium Sudan. by Willis,  Justin
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
01 February 2013
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Willis, Justin (2011) ’Tribal gatherings : colonial spectacle, native administration and local government in
Condominium Sudan.’, Past present., 211 (1). pp. 243-268.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtq055
Publisher’s copyright statement:
This is a pre-copy-editing author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Past present following peer
review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version is available online at: Willis, Justin (2011) ’Tribal gatherings :
colonial spectacle, native administration and local government in Condominium Sudan.’, Past present., 211 (1). pp.
243-268.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1 
Tribal gatherings: 
colonial spectacle, native administration, and local government in  
Condominium Sudan
1
 
 
In March 1952, the monthly summary circulated to senior members of the Sudan 
Government contained an enthusiastic description of an event in the western province of 
Kordofan, among the Kababish tribe of camel-owning Arab nomads. 
 
In Northern Kordofan a very big Tribal Gathering was held at Soderi on the 15th 
and 16th on the occasion of the opening of the new Kababish R[ural] D[istrict] 
C[ouncil] building . . .  It was attended by the Civil Secretary and many other 
British and Sudanese officials and guests. Three aeroplanes helped in bringing the 
guests from various parts of the Sudan. . .  In the afternoon a programme of sports 
and horse and camel races was held. At 6 pm a tea party was given during which a 
broadcast describing the events of the day was heard from Omdurman.
1
 
 
During the course of his packed two-day programme the Civil Secretary, James 
Robertson,  found time to present a medal to one Ahmed Mohammad Tingal, recently 
retired from the rank of Bash-Shawish (Company Sergeant-Major) after thirty-two years 
in the Sudan Police. Waiting to receive his decoration, Tingal may perhaps have reflected 
                                                          
 Initial research for this paper was undertaken during the course of an AHRC-funded project „Shaykhs, 
chiefs and clerks: governance in Condominium Sudan‟,  and I have benefited from the comments and help 
of many colleagues, notably Cherry Leonardi, Anna Clarkson, Yusuf Fadl Hassan and Peter Woodward. 
Particular thanks are also due to Jane Hogan, at the Sudan Archive, Durham,  to the staff of the National 
Records Office, Khartoum, and to a number of anonymous reviewers. 
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on the changes in Soderi, and in spectacles of government, during his years of service. 
Almost thirty years before, right at the start of his career, he had probably witnessed the 
arrival at Soderi in 1923 of the Governor of Kordofan, E.G. Sarsfield-Hall, on a tour of 
inspection.
2
 Sarsfield-Hall had arrived on horseback, and while his reception by „a party 
of officers and officials and shaykhs variously mounted on camels, horses and donkeys‟ 
had no doubt been picturesque, it was decidedly modest by comparison with the parades 
and bands which greeted Robertson in 1952. Sarsfield-Hall had to ride on several days 
north and west of Soderi to meet the nazir, the recognized leader, of the Kababish and his 
people. Robertson, on the other hand, found them waiting for him at the airstrip.  And 
while Robertson was led on a tour of the various buildings of the new „local government‟ 
of the Kababish, the only building of note which Sarsfield-Hall found was the combined 
house and office of the British Assistant District Commissioner responsible for the vast 
swathe of territory known as Dar Kababish, „the land of the Kababish‟.3  
 
If Tingal had known the area before he joined the police, he would have been aware that 
even the Soderi of 1923 was something of novelty: only fourteen years before, Soderi had 
been just one of several well-fields at which touring officials of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium might stop to meet with their new subjects.
4
 A photograph reveals that the 
only structure then was a hastily erected thatch booth, which provided just enough shade 
for a touring British officer, his Egyptian subordinate and eight local sheikhs (the term 
nazir had not yet come into Condominium usage to distinguish „paramount‟ sheikhs) to 
pose for a photograph beneath the flags of the co-domini, Britain and Egypt. The Briton 
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and Egyptian - uniformed and helmeted - stared at the camera, while their subjects looked 
fixedly at the ground.
5
 
 
The transformation of Soderi from a remote outpost to a local-governmental centre of  
progress, where officials could watch a „Tribal Gathering‟ before enjoying the self-
referential indulgence of listening to a radio broadcast about their own activities, is in 
itself a striking reminder of the consequences of colonial rule; as too is the transformation 
of the local sheikhs from sullen subjects to fellow tea-drinkers. On one level, it seems to 
provide ready evidence for the success of a grand colonial project of „enframing‟, as 
Timothy Mitchell would put it, through which people were herded into processes of 
representing power which enfolded them within the logic of state authority.
6
 Robertson‟s 
visit, in this analysis, appears as a culminating moment in the „euphemizing‟ of the 
coercive power of the colonial state – the practices through which the colonial state, 
possessed of the capacity for overwhelming violence, effectively  economized on the use 
of that violence. 
 
Spectacular power 
 
Yet this begs the question of why so many „tribesmen‟ – 7,000, according to the 
descriptions of the 1952 event – turned out to watch and ride, and of whether their 
perspective on the event was really that of the obedient subject. The spectacular display 
of colonial power has attracted a good deal of scholarly attention, and much of this has – 
if not always sharing the particular analytical model offered by Mitchell – suggested that 
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display was a key tool of colonial power (and of post-colonial power, in the case of Lisa 
Wedeen‟s study of the rule of spectacle in „habituating‟ the people of Syria into 
compliance with President Asad‟s rule).7 While Cannadine has located the incontinent 
colonial urge to ornamentalize as a product of Britain‟s very particular class dynamics, a 
wider body of work has tended to support Terry Ranger‟s argument that the colonial 
enthusiasm for spectacle may be understood as part of the endeavour of the colonial state 
– chronically short of resources, and always preferring to avoid the expense of punitive 
violence - to make its own authority seem „legitimate and natural rather than alien and 
oppressive‟. Parades and shows were part of the creation of what Helen Callaway, 
writing of Nigeria, has called the „symbolic order‟ of colonialism, within which ritual 
authorizes certain ways of seeing.
8
  But, like Bernard Cohn‟s seminal description of the 
„Imperial Assemblage‟ celebrating Victoria‟s installation as Empress of India – which, 
with 84,000 participants, was surely the largest such imperial performance -  such 
analyses privilege the colonialist as the author of exhibitions and reduce the non-British 
participants to „spectators to the British acting on her [the Empress‟] behalf‟.9 While they 
may help us understand British motivations, they do not explain how other ideas of 
representing – and debating – authority were involved in at least some of these 
performances. Andrew Apter‟s discussion of the durbars of colonial Nigeria, by contrast, 
has sought to explore the „limits of colonial spectacle‟, presenting such spectacles as a 
field of negotiation, with many „sight lines‟ and with multiple actors, and has shown how 
an African elite were able to use these events to reposition themselves as spectators;  
more recently Richard Fardon‟s work on Lela, in Cameroon, has taken a quite different 
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approach, seeing this not as an „imperial spectacle‟ but as a „baroque ceremonial, made 
up of numerous parts‟, in which European authorship has been decidedly limited.10 
 
In the context of this wider literature on colonial spectacle, the transformation of the 
performance of authority at Soderi offers a means to explore the role of such spectacles in 
the particular circumstances of Condominium Sudan – a territory which (like India) drew 
on more than one imperial tradition, but which was distinguished from much of colonial 
Africa by the importance of non-British administrators (initially Egyptians and, as time 
went on, Sudanese). This paper will show - through a brief discussion of the many forms 
which displays of authority took in Condominium Sudan – that British officials did 
explicitly see spectacular display as an effective tool of power. It will then suggest that 
the „tribal gathering‟ developed as a particular genre, which drew on a combination of 
Sudanese, Egyptian and British ideas, and was itself a product of constant renegotiation. 
The „gathering‟ was the form of display which rural Sudanese were most likely to 
experience, and it derived both its vigour and its effectiveness as a tool of power from 
that multiple authorship. Finally, the paper suggests that while spectacular display helped 
an emergent Sudanese elite define their position within the state, it also played a part in 
creating a practice of government which reduced a larger populace to the status of 
reluctant, if generally compliant, subjects.    
 
The history of display which led up to the 1952 gathering at Soderi is a particular one, but  
while Sudan was exceptional in some ways (and Northern Kordofan was exceptional 
even within Sudan), these events offer insight on  both how and why colonial subjects 
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became involved in these spectacles. It is impossible to offer an analysis of these 
spectacles which entirely escapes the limitations imposed by the sources, mostly English-
language accounts written by men whose presence as observers was in itself part of the 
process. But it is possible to see something of how other ideas of representing – and 
debating – authority were involved in ways that drew people into performances which 
helped  remake people‟s ideas of their relationship to power in ways which many of the  
„authors‟ of these sometimes unruly events would not have foreseen.  
 
This multiple and contested authorship also helps to locate the consequence of these 
spectacles of authority in the context of the changing rhetoric of  a colonial state which 
developed new technologies of power, and in  its final years, swapped the mantra of 
„native administration‟ for that of „local government‟ with surprising ease. The tribal 
gatherings of northern Kordofan suggest that there was a substantial continuity of process 
beneath this apparent shift in policy, from the  rough and ready bluster of the early state 
to the overtly bureaucratized forms of a late colonialism. Despite the distinctive new late-
colonial language of representation and development, the nature of these spectacles offer 
a reminder that in terms of the processes through which state power was made, this 
period was one of progression, rather than a change of course.  
 
Parades and uniforms 
 
„The colonialist‟, as Homi Bhabha has pointed out, „is an exhibitionist‟.11  Sudan was a 
regime of pomp, and exhibition took many forms. At its heart, where the colonial state 
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was strongest in terms of resources, architecture and uniforms were a priority from the 
creation of the Condominium in 1899, with the rebuilding of the old Turco-Egyptian 
capital at Khartoum on a grand scale providing physical assertion of the strength and 
permanence of the conquerors of Mahdism.
12
 Northern Sudanese men who were 
perceived to hold social influence were brought to Khartoum to be awed by the massive 
architecture; so too were chiefs from southern Sudan, „to enlarge their minds‟.13 One 
official description of such a visit recorded with satisfaction that „They seemed to be 
most struck by the large buildings and well laid-out gardens, which made it clear to them 
that the Government had come to stay‟.14 Accounts of these events often provided 
detailed  lists of the names and positions of the Sudanese who had been so impressed, in a 
comforting recitation of hierarchy.
15
  
 
Both space and time were demarcated by one genre of performance, which had the 
replication of uniforms and space as a central theme; the grounds of the Palace in 
Khartoum saw regular parades; and across the territory every provincial and district 
headquarters had its parade ground and flag. The Sudan Almanac listed –alongside 
weights and measures, ranks and titles – the correct way to construct a temporary 
mastaba, or saluting base.
16
 Having two colonial powers, Britain and Egypt, the 
Condominium was particularly well-provided with flags, and every important 
government building – as well as every touring administrator – flew both.17  During 
Reginald Wingate‟s long tenure as Governor-general, from 1899 to 1916, his morning 
exercise ride became in itself a minor parade;  inspections of police and army units across 
the country offered multiple quotidian reenactments of order.
18
 On special days – 
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Ramadhan, the birthday of the Prophet, the Haj festival – the Governor-general in 
Khartoum, and each provincial governor in his headquarters, would hold levees. In these 
displays, military power offered a backdrop to the show of order and hierarchy, with lines 
of robed Sudanese waiting their turn to greet the British official, receive awards, and 
„repeat their expressions of loyalty‟.19  
 
Deprived by political circumstance of  the opportunity to celebrate Empire day (since 
Sudan was a Condominium, and not part of the formal empire), the Britons of Sudan 
created their own imperial anniversary, „King‟s Day‟, which marked the extraordinarily 
brief visit paid to Sudan by George V in 1912.
20
 On the first anniversary, „[t]he events of 
the day at the headquarters of the Government included a march of the Sudanese Brigade 
through Omdurman, “Founders Day” and athletic sports at the Gordon College, an 
industrial fair and in the evening a torchlight tattoo and display of fireworks‟.21 In 1924 
an „aerial display‟ by the Royal Air Force was added to this display; twenty years later, 
officials were still reporting – somewhat improbably - that King‟s Day was being widely 
celebrated with „spontaneity and enjoyment‟.22 Again and again, flags, uniforms and 
weapons marked particular places as the domain of the state, and imprinted the state‟s 
logic on the passage of time. Descriptions of such events in the last years of the 
Condominium suggest that the forms established in the early years endured, with guards 
of honour being inspected and notables presented at levees.
23
 
 
Many of these events – like the King‟s 1912 visit, when he stepped off his boat for a few 
hours – were as carefully scripted by British officials as the „imperial assemblage‟ 
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described by Cohn. Up to 1924, an arriving or returning Governor-general was always 
greeted at the railway station by the Egyptian Army garrison; then escorted by notables 
and officials to the Palace, where a second Guard of Honour was mounted by the British 
garrison.
24
 In November 1924 the Egyptian Army units were expelled from Sudan by the 
British, in the wake of a political movement in favour of Sudanese union with Egypt;  the 
ritual routine was promptly changed in a symbolic display of the reduced Egyptian 
presence. In January 1925 the new Governor-general travelled by steamer, direct to the 
Palace, to be greeted by a guard of honour of British troops and the Sudanese who were 
being formed into the new Sudan Defence Force. The Sudanese notables were then 
summoned to the Palace for a King‟s Day audience.25  
 
But there were many spectacles of authority in Sudan and  – partly because of the long 
wrangle between Britain and Egypt over control of the Sudan – these drew on Sudanese 
and Egyptian, as well as British, imaginings of performed authority. Successor to the 
Turco-Egyptian state of the nineteenth century, the Condominium inherited part of its 
pageantry from that political culture, itself a hybrid of Ottoman practice and European 
influence, where uniforms and parades displayed the continuity between military 
organisation and state power, and Sudanese soldiers in remote stations – veterans who 
had served with Bazaine‟s soldiers in Mexico -  embellished their uniforms with French 
medals.
26
 And even in the Turco-Egyptian period, display had by no means always been 
straightforwardly  „colonial‟.  In 1875 an American soldier in Egyptian service had 
encountered a striking welcoming party: 
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We met the Governor of Dongola, coming with his escort to meet us. There was 
quite a spectacle at the head of the column. There were several Bedouins mounted 
on dromedaries; but above all, two Howara Arabs, mounted on fine horses of the 
country, whose feats of horsemanship were something marvellous.
27
 
 
Evidently, then, the subjects could steal the show. Such events involved a kind of 
ordering, and an acknowledgement of authority, but  not quite in the same way as 
military parades.  
 
The collapse of the Turco-Egyptian state in the face of the Mahdist movement of the 
early 1880s temporarily drove ornate uniforms from much of Sudan, but the Mahdist 
state was also much concerned with spectacle. The great prayer-ground at Omdurman, 
beside which was built the domed tomb of the Mahdi, became the venue for a weekly 
display of power, piety and obedience – and so, became in turn the focus for a ritual 
display of the destructive power of the Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1898, when the Mahdi‟s 
tomb was first shelled and then razed with explosives.  
  
And under Condominium rule, it was not only the state which staged dramatic 
performances. Famously, the visit in 1926 of Governor-general Archer to  Abdel Rahman 
al Mahdi, the son of Britain‟s old enemy, was turned by Abdel Rahman into a display of 
his wealth and the size of his following, and both Abdel Rahman and his principal 
political/religious rival, Sayyid Ali Mirghani, competed in public performances, or „arda, 
throughout the Condominium.
28
 Flags and mounted followers were key elements in their 
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competition; but so too was the sheer number of pedestrian followers who would turn out 
to stand, chant, and break out into enthusiastic demonstrations of adulation. The tone of 
these displays emphasised wealth and size of following,  rather than uniformity and the 
fixed regulation of space and time; but they did assert order and hierarchy. They offer a 
colourful reminder that Sudanese, like Britons and Egyptians, saw public displays as a 
means to assert, and debate, the nature of authority: these were „publics‟, to borrow a 
term from the later work of Habermas, spheres of debate to which many had access – if 
not all on equal terms.
29
  
 
The spectacles of authority at Soderi must be seen in the context of this wider culture of 
authoritative display which – as will be noted below – had its local forms in northern 
Kordofan. The significance of this is two-fold: the cultural familiarity of display may 
help explain why people were willing to take part in colonial performances of power. Yet 
at the same time the ability to read such events as part of established culture  may have 
meant that while officials – British, Egyptian, or Sudanese - congratulated themselves on 
displays which enacted the ordering logic of government, other participants may have 
understood the implications of that ordering rather differently.  
 
From native administration to local government 
 
Any consideration of those possible multiple meanings is complicated by uncertainties 
amongst British officials themselves about what kind of „symbolic order‟ such spectacles 
of authority actually represented. The Civil Secretary‟s visit to Soderi in 1952 brought 
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together in dramatic performance two apparently contrasting ideas of the relationship 
between the state and local institutions of authority. From its inception, the Condominium 
had relied on an accommodation with „notables‟, who dominated the social landscape 
seen by officials; the exact definition of „notables‟ had been a little hazy, embracing a 
combination of the more tractable religious scholars and Sufi leaders of northern Sudan, 
and prominent tribal leaders. From the early 1920s, this accommodation had been  
formalized and theorized on a more explicitly ethnic basis, as the local expression of the 
wider British belief in indirect rule. „Native administration‟ as it was usually called in the 
Sudan, rested on the assumption that ethnicity in itself generated locally legitimate forms 
of authority which the state could use and subordinate.  British observers identified the 
political unrest of 1924 as the work of a dissatisfied, educated group of Sudanese who 
worked largely as lower-ranking employees of the government. Drawing on experience 
and terminology from Egypt, the British dismissively called this  group the effendiyya, 
and, driven by suspicion of  them,  elevated „native administration‟ to an almost 
obsessive creed, the local counterpart of the wider suspicion of the „man in trousers‟ 
which was a feature of British territories across Africa.
30
 In Sudan, this creed generated  a 
body of vividly-phrased documentation and a system of local administration, in rural 
areas in particular, in which recognized tribal leaders controlled their own courts, 
collected taxes for the government, and assumed multiple (often extra-legal) executive 
roles.
31
 This has provided ample evidence for those wishing to see Sudan as one more 
example of the colonial invention of tradition which, across Africa,  generated the 
„decentralized despotism‟ which Mahmood Mamdani has identified as the principal 
political legacy of „late colonialism‟.32  
 13 
 
The very richness of this record of prejudice has tended to divert scholarship from 
questioning how wide the divide between the „traditional leaders‟ and the effendiyya 
actually was, or from  exploring how we can understand this divide in the context of the 
rather different governmental rhetoric of the final decades of „late colonialism‟. In Sudan, 
as elsewhere in British Africa, the language of the last two decades of colonial rule 
revolved around local government – not „native administration‟.33 This shift has attracted 
little scholarly attention – writing of Ghana, Richard Rathbone has, only half-jokingly, 
suggested that the term „local government‟ itself is so boring as to repel academic interest 
– and in Sudan,  opinion has been divided as to the significance of this change in 
terminology.
34
 Daly has described it as a „major theoretical reorientation‟, but Gaafar 
Bakheit – Sudanese academic-cum-politician, writing from a perspective which identified 
tribal leaders as the reactionary  long-term opponents of a governmental project of social 
and economic transformation -   has argued that this was merely a shift in rhetoric: „Local 
government was not in reality the grave of native administration but the waiting room in 
which she finished her make-up and reappeared more lively and fascinating.‟35  
 
The debate over this results partly from the ambivalence of British attitudes towards the 
Sudanese effendiyya – or the „graduates‟, as such Sudanese came to call themselves, in 
reference to the experience of secondary school education which many of them shared. 
As has been widely noted – and is apparent from almost any document of the period – 
British distrust for this group was profound.
36
 But British officials also believed in the 
inherent superiority of the political culture which they shared with the graduates,  in 
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which the administrative state played a central role as the guarantor of stability and  
progress; and as Heather Sharkey‟s work has shown, the graduates‟ confidence in their 
mastery of this culture was profoundly bound up with their commitment to nationalism.
37
  
 
Given this ambivalence, it seems unsurprising that British officials had multiple, 
changing and partly contradictory expectations of local government. It had been 
conceived partly as a means to distract the graduates from larger political ambitions, or at 
least to delay the realization of such ambitions: „preparation for the practice of political 
self-government‟, as Lord Hailey said of Africa more generally; „an excellent training 
ground and testing ground for Sudanese administrators‟, as a Sudan Government memo 
put it. But local government was also seen by British officials as a means to spread more 
widely the administrative practices which they believed were inseparable from progress: 
a way for the „progressive classes‟ to challenge „native opinion in general (often 
conservative, suspicious and narrow)‟.38 This uncertainty over purpose was matched by 
an uncertainty over how local government should be created: elections might offer a new 
legitimacy and ensure the involvement of the educated, but they might also produce local 
government bodies whose members lacked the necessary modern competencies. 
 
As wider political circumstances – notably Anglo-Egyptian rivalry – rapidly accelerated 
progress towards self-government after 1945, some Britons seized on the idea that a new 
kind of  local government might offer a local check on any „irresponsible minority‟ who 
might seize control of the central state.
39
 But when Arthur Marshall, Town Clerk of 
Coventry, was brought to Sudan to advise on local government, he viewed  local 
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government not as a check on the central state, but rather as the arm of the progressive 
central state. The real task of local government was „persuading the people to accept [the] 
services‟ offered by the „technical central departments‟ of the government.40 On the other 
hand, Marshall saw the entanglement of local government with „native administration‟ as 
deeply problematic, and he urged the need to separate them out, and to restrict the role of 
native administration to limited judicial functions. 
 
The vision of local government as an arm of a progressive central state was one which the 
graduates shared. But while Marshall had seen  electoral representation as an important 
element in local government, British officials and their Sudanese subordinates – soon to 
be colleagues, and then successors – rapidly became sceptical of the value of this. As 
they raced to create new structures of local government in the last few years of the 
Condominium, administrators found that elected councils did not necessarily ensure a 
new commitment to technocratic progress in local government, and they began to 
emphasise the need for the government in Khartoum to have „powers of inspection and 
direction‟ or even to  „have control over the activities of the local government 
authorities‟.41 It was decided  that the „Executive Officers‟ of councils should be 
administrators trained centrally, who would wear semi-military uniforms with shoulder 
badges to show rank and  khaki helmets and that elected councillors - who were not 
always possessed of the kind of skills needed to run local government – should work 
alongside appointed members, who might include „traditional‟ rulers as well as educated 
Sudanese. And councils should be chaired by district commissioners, representatives of 
the superior political culture of the central state.
42
 As Patricia Stamp has observed of 
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similar processes in neighbouring Kenya, the rhetoric of late-colonial local government 
emphasized local democracy; but the practice enhanced institutions of central control.
43
 
 
Despite the confusions and uncertainties in policy and the changes in language, therefore,  
the progression from native administration to local government represented a continuity 
in the processes of state authority, not a disjuncture. This was not a dramatic shift from 
„tradition‟ to „modernity‟; nor a story of the continuing devolvement of state power to 
neo-traditional local despots. Native administration and local government were stages in 
a sustained process through which the agents of the central state – British, and 
increasingly Sudanese -  sought to incorporate and remake local forms of authority, 
extending their control over everyday life as they did so. The more officials talked of 
decentralization, the more they established systems to scrutinize and control from the 
centre.  
 
 
Gathering the tribe 
 
The 1952 gathering at Soderi must, then, be seen in these two contexts: on the one hand, 
the existence of  multiple cultures of authoritative performance, and on the other hand a 
wider process of extending scrutiny and control in which – despite its rhetoric – the 
colonial state steadily sought to subordinate local forms of authority.  As will be 
suggested below, the changing nature of authoritative spectacles in Kordofan show how 
the ambitions for control and the sense of superiority possessed by officials of the central 
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state worked to bring together a Sudanese elite which combined graduates and traditional 
leaders, and which was increasingly remote from the rural subjects of the late-colonial 
state.  
 
Sarsfield-Hall‟s 1923 trip was not his first encounter with Ali el Tom, then nazir of the 
Kababish. Like the other sheikhs and nazirs of Kordofan, Ali el Tom was by this time 
being called into the provincial capital at El Obeid at least once a year to meet with 
British officials. That was a meeting which was in the early 1920s acquiring its own 
routine: dressed in the official „robes of honour‟ which marked their status, the notables 
would be photographed and would join officials in forming the audience for spectacles 
which were performed by their subjects.
44
 In itself, this routine marked a change from the 
early years of the Condominium: in 1906, the Governor-general, visiting El Obeid, had 
been met outside the town by a number of nazirs and sheikhs and their followers, who  
put on a display which hinted at the possibility of defiance as much as it expressed 
loyalty. The Governor-general was riding (there being no railway to El Obeid at this 
time): he „was met two miles outside the town by 1,500 horsemen‟ who  „formed up 
behind and accompanied him to the Town, making repeated charges on each flank en 
route.‟45  The Governor-general chose to interpret this as a picturesque display of loyalty 
in his formal reports, while privately drawing the more disquieting message that this 
„enormous crowd‟ had revealed the inadequacy of the government‟s forces in Kordofan.46 
But within a few years, there were no more such displays at the provincial capital. The 
crucial moment was, perhaps the opening of the railway to El Obeid in 1912, which was 
marked rather differently, after the Governor-general‟s arrival by train: 
 18 
 
A levee was held on the morning of the 27
th
 instant which was attended by the 
officials and native sheikhs and notables of the province. Their Excellencies [the 
Governor-general was accompanied by Earl Kitchener] subsequently visited the 
town and markets. On the following morning there was a parade of troops . . . At 
the conclusion of the native sports in the afternoon, the assembled native 
horsemen and camelmen were inspected and subsequently, to the number of 
2,500, galloped past their Excellencies.
47
  
 
El Obeid was now the territory of the government, where horsemen were subjected to the 
authoritative gaze of officials.  
 
In 1923 at Soderi there were no „native horsemen‟. Assembled at this „outpost of empire‟ 
- as Sarsfield-Hall called it - was „[a] very smart guard of honour . .  mounted outside the 
ADC‟s house, which I inspected‟.48 It was only when Sarsfield-Hall had left Soderi, and 
passed beyond the space of the government, that he was met by an escort drawn from 
members of Ali el Tom‟s family. They rode with him for three days until he encountered 
the nazir himself and „a large party of people on camels and horses‟ which enveloped his 
little travelling column of order, „galloping about brandishing their whips and bucking 
their horses.‟ Sarsfield-Hall evidently thought this a rather chaotic scene: „Just as we got 
to the outskirts of Sheikh Ali Tom‟s encampment there was a terrible collision between 
one of his young sons and his uncle, an elderly man of over sixty‟.49 There was no 
„inspection‟ here. 
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It is tempting to view Ali el Tom as the real author of these events; he had had ample 
opportunity to observe the British fondness for display, having been present at the King‟s 
visit, and many other occasions (including a delegation to the United Kingdom in 1919, 
to congratulate the King on victory in the First World War).
50
 Certainly,  the Governor 
left with entirely the right impression, from Ali el Tom‟s perspective: „Sheikh Ali Tom 
and his people are most attractive unspoilt Arabs‟.51 At the same time, Ali el Tom was 
able to demonstrate to his own people his intimacy with the government – the hakuma, as 
it was widely called - perceived by ordinary Sudanese as a generally remote but potent 
force. The whole event, then, emphasised Ali el Tom‟s position as intermediary; master 
of the bucking horsemen and friend of the uniformed official. 
 
But to understand the behaviour of the riders solely in terms of Ali el Tom‟s interests is 
to elide the motives of other actors. While Sarsfield-Hall and other Britons liked to 
imagine Ali el Tom as the manifestation of an unquestioned traditional authority, the 
nazir was actually engaged in a prolonged and determined effort to assert and extend his 
control over „his‟ people. He had inherited an uncertain role from his nineteenth century 
forebears, and his personal position had been weak in the early years of the 
Condominium; but he had transformed the role of Kababish leader – and, in effect, 
recreated Kababish identity -  largely though a relationship with the British officials of 
the Condominium which gave him formidable powers of patronage and punishment, 
through his role in the tax system and his effective control of an extra-legal court 
system.
52
 The riders had good cause to try and please him, and no doubt many of them 
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were drawn from his own lineage and section of the tribe, the Awlad Fadlallah of the 
Nurab, the size of which had grown considerably as individuals attached themselves as 
subordinates to seek his favour.
53
  
 
But their tumultuous display may have been more than that, again.  Displays of riding 
were part of a culture of individual bravado and masculinity, a vigorous assertion of 
personal potency, reminding the nazir of his subjects‟ potential ungovernability and of 
the conditionality of his  position, which rested on the ability to quell disputes among 
them and to defend their interests – grazing, water, livestock – against other tribes, or 
against excessive state imposts. Daring public displays of riding were a part of Kababish 
culture from the mid-nineteenth century, as individualistic displays at funerals or on 
religious feast days.
54
 The admiring account of Kababish life in the early 1930s offered 
by Hasan Nagila – a schoolteacher from central Sudan – shows how Ali el Tom 
effectively acted as the patron for the prayers held at his dry-season encampment on 
religious festivals, and then himself led the displays of riding  - which Nagila called 
‘arda, though he noted the Kababish called them ghalb - which followed the prayers. 
These were displays for which the only audience were the Kababish themselves.
55
 The 
spectacles which greeted Sarsfield-Hall were part of the prolonged negotiation of the 
relationship between nazir and people. 
 
And there was another aspect to the performances of welcome noted by official travellers 
in northern Kordofan. Up to the early 1930s, there are repeated mentions of dancing and 
singing by groups of women – mostly of slave origin - who thus noisily and visibly 
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asserted their existence.
56
 Like the displays of riding, these were not performed solely for 
such visitors, but drew on established practice on feast-days.
 57
 And, it might be argued, 
these performances too were double-edged: the songs of these women largely described 
the generosity and bravery of the nazir and his family, but such praise was also an 
assertion of the duties of a master.
58
 
 
Impressive as they were, the displays encountered by Sarsfield-Hall and others in Dar 
Kababish were small in terms of the numbers involved. In this question of size, and 
location, they were strikingly different from another kind of display which was 
developing elsewhere in Kordofan at this time, as the domain of inspection grew. The 
first references by British officials to „horse shows‟ come from the second decade of the 
Condominium, at a time when horses and camels were still essential to the mobility of 
administrators, police and army; the „horse shows‟ were an opportunity for the 
government to buy remounts.
59
 But in the few years after the First World War, as the 
ideology of native administration was developed, the horse show turned into the „Tribal 
Gathering‟. 60 This was an event which made physical the articulation between the 
hakuma and its collective subject, „the tribe‟, and in British eyes it was an assertion of the 
centrality of „tribal‟ identity and traditional authority: 
 
The horse show at Abu Zabad combines a demonstration of allegiance to the 
Government with a horse show, a race meeting and an occasion for general jollity. 
It is an event of some political importance and it is being reproduced in other 
parts of the country. The procedure has grown up by custom 
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There was an ostentatious element of ordering to this; British officials (in this case 
including the Governor-general) rode round inspecting the horsemen, and then took up 
position on the saluting base while the horsemen rode past in fours.
61
 Evidently proud of 
this new „custom‟, British officials were condescendingly rude about French attempts to 
organize similar events in their neighbouring territory.
62
  
 
There was still an element of challenge in this, however. In 1921, events around the 
Homr gathering (in the south of Kordofan)  revealed how officials saw the gathering as 
potentially dangerous, but also as an event which they could rescript to affirm their 
authority. With seditious letters from Egypt being circulated among the Homr, the DC 
„decided that it would be unwise to assemble the tribe for the annual horse show unless 
he had the support of troops‟. But neither did he wish to cancel the show, particularly 
since the Homr had not yet paid their tax; and so he delayed the show on a pretext and 
sent for reinforcements. The arrival of „the motorized machine gun unit‟ reassured him, 
and led to „an exceptionally successful horse show.' Meanwhile, in the background of the 
gathering, the DC dismissed a suspect headman and arrested his supporters.
63
    
 
By the early 1930s, tribal gatherings were being budgeted and planned at provincial level, 
and the holding of a successful tribal gathering was offered as „evidence of the stability 
and progress of the native administration‟.64 For these performances, a cast of thousands 
was required, and officials routinely reported – or boasted of - the number who 
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attended.
65
 In 1937 the  Governor-general worked the tribal gathering into a casual 
teleology of the rituals of government: 
 
In the outlying districts local Administrations endeavour to substitute for warlike 
preparation and the glamour of the foray the excitement of tribal assemblies, with 
the valuable opportunities they offer for sifting grievances and adjusting inter-
tribal affairs. In more developed areas popular gatherings are also a feature but 
take the form of horse and agricultural shows which can combine incentive to 
improvements with the fun of the fair.
66
 
 
  The description was historically misleading – horse shows predated „tribal assemblies‟ – 
but the vision of progress implicit in this passage was clear. Picturesque as they were, 
these events were destined to turn slowly into a new kind of display more suited to the 
state‟s vision of progress, and they were themselves an important tool of transformation; 
and so, in October 1939, administrators were encouraged to go ahead with tribal 
gatherings in spite of what was rather primly described as the „international situation‟.67 
 
The „gathering‟ took some time to reach Dar Kababish; when it did, it marked a new 
level of government supervision. Administrators who, like Sarsfield-Hall, made their way 
deep into Dar Kababish, were routinely welcomed with displays of riding bravado.
68
 But 
it was not until 1945 that there was a Kababish „gathering‟ of the kind graced by the 
presence of British officials, when El Tom Ali (Ali El Tom‟s successor) hosted a 
gathering which offered a quite different vision of order to the tumultuous greeting given 
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to Sarsfield-Hall. The central moment was the presentation to El Tom by the Governor of 
a „Special Robe of Honour‟. After this, following a „short formal ride‟, El Tom „sat on a 
sheepskin in front of his [British] guests and held a levee‟.69 
 
By this time, new practices of bureaucratic scrutiny had spread to Dar Kababish;  
officials from the central government now pored over the details of a written Kababish 
annual budget which set out everything from El Tom‟s wages to the amounts spent on 
veterinary and mail services and tents for the mobile Kababish school.
70
 Elsewhere in 
Kordofan, official scripting of gatherings – in which Sudanese administrators were 
playing a growing role, alongside their British superiors – was increasingly 
foregrounding civic modernity, rather than  traditional bravado. In 1945, in asking for the 
programme of gatherings, the Civil Secretary specifically mentioned that these should be 
„of concrete benefit . . . to the development of Local Government‟.71 One DC from 
Eastern Kordofan had already reported earlier that year that for the Gawamaa tribal 
gathering he had planned some „innovations‟, and the subsequent report of the gathering 
also highlighted these 
 
The exhibits prepared for the Gathering included a model house, and a not-so-
model house which unfortunately seemed much more attractive to popular fancy, 
a propaganda photo exhibit from the Information Office, an exhibit of handwork 
by the Central Prison El Obeid and a stall of handwork by the two girls‟ schools 
of Rahad and Umm Ruwaba
72
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There were also nightly cinema shows; and, for official guests only, a „tea party‟ hosted 
by the nazir of the tribe.  
 
These were large events: ‟15,000 camel-men‟ attended the Dar Hamid gathering in 1946 
and their planning seems to have become ever more precise.
73
 Displays of riding were 
still part of these plans: once the members of the tribe had observed the exhibition of 
progress, they could ride under the inspecting eyes of officials and nazirs.
 74
 
 
But the 
spectacles of bravado, with their complex message of potential turbulence contained by 
conditional acknowledgement of authority, had moved to the margins of an exhibition of 
progress – in official eyes at least. And women‟s involvement had changed completely; 
they now had a presence only through their role in institutions of formal learning, and 
singers and dancers had disappeared in favour of „handwork‟. 
 
In Dar Kababish, the event at Soderi in 1952 followed this new script of civic progress. In 
1946, a departing DC had suggested that there was a need for a „modification‟ to the 
system of government for the Kababish which would maintain „the Nurab system‟ but 
also embrace „new forms of Committee government‟.75 Dar Kababish quickly took on the 
new language of local government; at meetings of „representatives of the tribes‟ of the 
Kababish Confederation  in  1947 and 1948, „useful discussions were held on water 
supplies, medical facilities, veterinary services and education . . . The budget for 1949 
was also discussed‟.76 A similar meeting the following year „agreed to create a new 
„executive machinery‟ at Soderi, the administrative headquarters, to bring „real 
progress‟.77  
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The „machinery‟ thus created was the Kababish Rural District Council, whose building 
the Civil Secretary came to open in 1952. The composition of this suggests the increasing 
closeness between the graduates and the traditional leaders, and between native 
administration and local government. The Council – all of whose members were 
appointed -  drew heavily on the educated members of Ali el Tom‟s family, who had 
benefited from the old nazir‟s decision to create what was in effect a private family 
school at his encampment, and to send some of his children  to secondary school 
elsewhere in Sudan.
78
 It was chaired by the District Commissioner, now metamorphosed 
into the Inspector of Local Government; the nazir became the assistant chair, and the 
Assistant District Commissioner was restyled the „Executive Officer‟.79 In keeping with 
the official culture of technocratic guidance,  one of the first acts of the Council was to 
adopt a „five-year development plan‟.80 
 
In the official account of the 1952 events, this culture of ordered development was 
foregrounded. The Civil Secretary 
 
officially opened the new Council buildings. While he inspected the offices, 
members took their seats and  important guests assembled in the Visitor‟s Gallery. 
The Civil Secretary then re-entered the Council Chamber and a speech of 
welcome and thanks was made . . . The Civil Secretary then inspected the 
Elementary School, Merkaz offices, Veterinary Dispensary, the S[udan] 
M[edical] S[ervice] Dispensary.. 
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The invitation list emphasized the exhibitionary aspect of the opening: alongside the Civil 
Secretary, the Governor and Deputy Governor of Kordofan and various other 
administrators and technical staff, there was a „Films Officer‟ from the Public Relations 
Office of the Sudan Government and two representatives of the British Central 
Information Office.
81
  
 
The „show‟ of riding was relegated to the second day of the event; and in both location 
and style this was most definitely an inspection, held on a „parade ground‟ before a 
„saluting base‟. This performance completed, the Civil Secretary retired for a „private 
meeting with the Kababish tribal leaders‟, before flying back to Khartoum; the 
programme of races was completed after he had left.
82
 From a state perspective, then, 
displays of men‟s riding prowess were now a minor part of the „Gathering‟, the riders had 
become marginal to a dramatic performance which manifested the triumph of a central 
culture of government. And, as Apter has suggested of Nigerian durbars, a local elite  - 
which in this case included both traditional rulers and the educated Sudanese staff of this 
local governmental centre - were „assuming the viewpoint of privileged spectatorship‟.83 
This was a viewpoint in which the state was seen as potentially a Sudanese, not a British 
possession: strikingly, for one self-consciously political Sudanese journalist, the 
gathering provided a moment when he realized that „tribal chiefs‟ could share his vision 
of nationalism, looking forward to the end of the British presence.
84
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But the continued, if marginal, presence of displays of riding suggests that the 
performance was not simply the triumph of the ordering state, nor solely a manifestation 
of the complex relationship between the British, the graduates and traditional leaders. 
Why did „7,000 camelmen‟ appear to ride at the gathering? Some may have come 
grudgingly, viewing the tribal gathering as another impost made by the nazir and his 
allies (as one  assistant district commissioner had suggested was the case with tribal 
gatherings elsewhere in Kordofan).
85
 But off the main stage, the races and riding may 
have been rather less disciplined, and more fun,  than the written account implies; and 
personal bravado, competition and displays of eye-catching daring evoked a relationship 
between a nazir and his people based on a compact between powerful, autonomous 
subjects and a leader whose authority rested on his ability to represent them in dealing 
with other tribes or with government.   It was a compact which colonial rule had already 
broken, but which the „camelmen‟ were still seeking to perform. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Wedeen‟s study of the cult of presidential power in modern Syria has argued that 
spectacular performances „produce political power‟ even though they also „invite 
transgressions.‟86  The massed rallies and choreographed performances of Asad‟s Syria 
were in many ways remote from the „gatherings‟ of Condominium Sudan. They were 
more tightly scripted and choreographed, and offered much less room for multiple 
authorship; and, perhaps because they lacked any obvious resonance with local cultures 
of authoritative spectacle, attendance was much more clearly enforced than was the case 
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in Sudan. Yet Wedeen‟s argument is persuasive in showing  how, while people  mock 
these events, and reject the ideas of those who organize them,  by taking part they 
nonetheless submit themselves to a kind of disciplinary process  - in the Foucauldian 
sense - which teaches them „compliance‟.  
 
Compliance, however, is not quite the same as a surrender to the logic of the state, and 
the story of Dar Kababish is illustrative both of the limits of spectacle and the limits of a 
state which uses spectacle to economize on the use of its limited coercive resources.  The 
„baroque‟ spectacle of the tribal gathering was not drawn solely from the imagination of 
officials, and offered space for „transgressions‟ which were pleasurable and culturally 
familiar. For an elite, it provided the opportunity to become spectators, while it   beguiled 
subjects into performances of compliance by disguising these as enactments of the 
relationship between a sheikh and his people. But while acting out the role of subject 
might habituate people to compliance, the simultaneous acting out of defiance constantly 
reminded all involved that the hakuma, the government, was essentially part of an alien 
order. The gathering was the tool of a government which sought constantly to extend its 
control; but it also allowed – indeed, relied on – an expression of the cultural distance 
between government and people.  
 
The consequences of this were profound, for the „symbolic order‟ that such spectacles 
reproduced was one which divided the tea-drinking elite from their subjects; and it was 
this order which the post-colonial state inherited. In Dar Kababish, the continued distance 
between people and government was very apparent. As one of Talal Asad‟s informants 
rather memorably put it in the 1960s: „[t]he hakuma is the hakuma and we are like 
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cattle.‟87 And some twenty years after that, the „traditional authorities‟ continued to play 
the role of agents of the developmental state, despite popular rejection of the projects of 
that state.
88
 
  
More widely in Sudan, by the 1960s it was already clear that the experiment in local 
government had secured neither popular support nor significant progress in state projects 
of development.
89
  Twenty years after the Marshall report, one Sudanese local 
government expert was still hopeful that – despite the apparent failures of the system so 
far -  representative local government would „associate the citizenry with the immediate 
ends of local development and encourage them to participate with enthusiasm in the 
physical tasks of development‟ and would „produce and legitimize modern leaders to 
substitute for the traditional leaders of the decaying tribal society‟.90 Shortly after he 
outlined this vision the existing councils were swept away by Nimeiri, to be replaced by 
„People‟s Local Government Councils‟; only for these too to be denounced as a failure, 
and for Sudan to return, under the Islamist military regime which took power in 1989, to 
a partial reliance on „traditional‟.91 None of these systems has been a success, in terms of 
local legitimacy or „development‟; in Sudan, as elsewhere in Africa,  local government 
has in practice been neither „local‟ nor „government‟, and has disappointed all of the 
contradictory expectations placed upon it by late-colonial and post-colonial enthusiasts.
92
 
The legacy of the weak colonial state, and its reliance on  authoritative spectacle, was a 
population which, while it might have learned compliance, had not learned to share the 
ordering logic of government.  
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